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Correlates of Progressive Taxation in the American States 
GARY H. BROOKS 
University of Mississippi 
The decade of the 1960's witnessed a significant new development in 
the study of state and local politics-the investigation of the relation -
ships between socioeconomic and political variables and policy outp uts. 
Dawson and Robinson\ Dye 2, Hofferbert8, Froman\ and Sharkansky6 
were the pioneers in this area and their work was focused initially at the 
state level. The groundbreaking work of these political scientists followed 
the earlier studies of the relationship between socioeconomic variab les 
and the magnitude of governmental expenditures in the states by econom-
ists such as Fabricant 6, Fisher 7, and Sachs and Harris. 8 
To a great extent political scientists engaged in comparative policy 
studies at the state level have continued to focus their attention on the 
relationships between various socioeconomic and political variables and 
the level of governmental expenditures in various policy areas ( e.g., 
welfare, highways, and education) .9 To date, three major findings appe ar 
to have emerged from this rather extensive body of literature: ( l ) that 
socioeconomic variables have relatively high explanatory power for 
public policy outputs measured in terms of levels of revenues and ex-
1 Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic 
Variables and Welfare Politics in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25 
( 1963), 265-289. 
2 Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public ( Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1966). 
3 Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structura l 
and Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science 
Review, 60 ( 1966), 73-82. 
4 Lewis A. Froman, "Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics," 
American Political Science Review, 60 ( 1966), 952-961. 
5 Ira Sharkansky, "Correlates of State Government Expenditures," paper prepared 
for delivery at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, September, 1966 (mimeo). 
6 Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity in the United States 
Since 1900 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), ch. 6 
7 Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures," 
National Tax Journal, 14 (1961), 349-355; "Interstate Variation in State and Local 
Government Expenditures," ibid., 17 ( 1964), 57-64. 
8 Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Gov-
ernment Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds ," Ibid., 17 ( 1964), 
75-85. 
9 For an excellent review of this literature, see Richard I. Hofferbert, "State and 
Community Policy Studies: A Review of Comparative Input-Output Analyses," in 
Jam es A. Robinson, ed., Political Science Annual Ill (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1972). 
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penditures; ( 2) that political variables generally have little or no inde-
pendent impact on levels of revenues and expenditures ( with the possible 
exception of welfare-education policies) 10 ; ( 3) and that the explanatory 
power of socioeconomic variables varies depending on the type of ex-
penditure examined ( with the relationship being particularly weak in 
the area of welfare expenditures). 
This early preoccupation with the explanation of the magnitude of 
state policy efforts as measmed by levels of revenues and expenditures 
led to the neglect of the distributional aspects of governmental policies. 
The concern of Harold Lasswell for "who gets what, when, and how" 11 
was generally overlooked as the search for explanations of the levels of 
governmental policy efforts took precedence over the explanation of the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of governmental policies. 
The first major effort to counter this neglect of the distributional aspects 
of governmental policies appeared in 1970.12 In a seminal work, Fry and 
Winters suggested that prior findings regarding the primacy of socio-
economic variables in the explanation of state policy outputs had been 
the result of the examination of a measure of public policy (levels of 
revenues and expenditures) in which the influence of political system 
characteristics is likely to be neglible. 
Fry and Winters shifted attention to the net redistributive impact of 
revenue and expenditure policies in the states. As they had expected, 
Fry and Winters found that political variables were considerably more 
powerful than socioeconomic variables in explaining interstate variations 
in redistiibutive patterns. 13 By shifting the analysis of public policy in 
the states from the explanation of revenue and expenditure levels to the 
distribution of the benefits and costs of revenue and expenditure policies, 
Fry and Winters attempted to revive Lasswell's concern for who gets 
what, when, and how and called attention to a dimension of public policy 
which appears to be affected significantly by political variables. 14 
10 See Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, 
Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, 63 ( 1969), 867-
879; and Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Wel-
fare Policies in the American States," American Political Science Review, 63 ( 1969), 
265-289. 
11 Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: P. 
Smith, 1950). 
12 Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 64 ( 1970), 508-522. 
13 Fry and Winters found that socioeconomic variables alone accounted for 17% 
of the variance in redistribution in the 48 states and that political variables accounted 
for 38% of that variance. 
14 For critiques of Fry and Winters, see John L. Sullivan, "A Note on Redis-
tributive Politics," American Political Science Review, 66 ( 1972), 1301-1305; and 
Bernard H. Booms and James R. Halldorson, "The Politics of Redistribution: A 
Reformulation," American Political Science Review, 67 ( 1973), 924-933. 
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Even more neglected than the question of who gets what, when, and 
how has been the question of who pays what, when , and how. Despite 
the fact that the allocation of tax costs is among the primary poli tical 
concerns of many citizens , political scientists have paid little attenti on 
to the direct allocation of the monetary costs of governmental activity 
or to the forces which impinge upon that allocation.15 
One of the few political scientists to direct his attention to the analysis 
of tax policy in the American states is Thomas R. Dye .16 Dye prese nts a 
model for the analysis of public policy derived from the early work of 
David Easton.17 In the Dye model, inputs are operationalized in terms 
of measures of income, urbanization , industrialization, and education; 
the political system is operationalized in terms of party compe tition, 
legislative malapportionment, electoral participation, and Democratic 
control of the legislature and governor's office; tax policy is operati onal-
ized in terms of levels of taxation, average tax burden, and the perce ntage 
of state taxes raised through various tax measures ( e.g., personal income, 
sales, and gasoline). 
Dye's major findings concerning state tax policies are summarized 
below: 
1. State tax levels are directly related to measures of economic de-
velopment. 
2. Low average state tax burdens are directly related to measures of 
economic development ( particularly measures of industrializati on). 
3. No significant relationship exists between measures of economic de-
velopment and the degree to which a state relies upon income or 
sales taxes as a source of tax revenue. 
4. Political variables have no significant independent relationship with 
any measure of state tax policies. 
For those interested in the explanation of interstate variations in the 
distribution of tax costs, Dye's findings are somewhat puzzling. The im-
pact of measures of economic development on state tax levels and aver-
age tax burdens is not surprising and reinforces existing evidence th at 
socioeconomics variables have relatively high explanatory value in terms 
of public policy measured by levels of taxes and expenditures. The sur-
15 Major exceptions to this neglect include: Clara Penruman, "The Politics of 
Taxation," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds., Politics in the American 
States ( Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 520-555; Ira Sharkansky, The Poli-
tics of Taxing and Spend ing (Indiana polis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); and Glenn W. 
Fisher, Taxes and Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969). 
16 Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, ch. 7. 
17 See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," W01'ld 
Politics, 9 ( 1957), 383-400; and Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Eng le-
wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965). 
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rising facet of Dye's study is the finding that neither socioeconomic 
~ariables nor political variables have significant explanatory power in re-
lation to state reliance upon progressive or regressive taxes as revenue 
measures. 
If Dye's findings are correct, they have great significance for the future 
direction of research attempting to explain interstate variations in the 
distribution of tax costs. Assuming the accuracy of Dye's analysis, the 
major thrust of future research into this area of public policy should be 
focused on the processes by which tax policy is insulated from the im-
pact of socioeconomic and political influences. A promising start in this 
direction has been made by Ira Sharkansky. 18 Sharkansky argues that 
taxing and spending decisions are surrounded by conflict and controversy 
and that no infallible economic guidelines about what "ought" to be done 
exist. Sharkansky identifies two syndromes of decision-making behavior 
designed to cope with this conflict: contained specialization and incre-
rnentalism. Contained specialization refers to the attempt to isolate fiscal 
decision-making from the conflict of the political arena and to the wil-
lingness of decision-makers to defer to the recommendations of "experts" 
on specific questions. Incrementalism refers to the attempt to reduce the 
complexity of fiscal decision-making by accepting previous decisions 
without review and focusing attention upon changes at the margin of 
existing policies. 
Dye's work, however, has been subjected to a rather vigorous critical 
examination, and a re-examination of the relationships between various 
socioeconomic and political variables and state tax policies would ap-
pear to be in order. A great deal of the difficulty encountered in Dye's 
analysis lies in his analytic model. As Jacob and Lipsky note, "The first 
problem with this [Dye's] operationalized model is that income, urbani-
zation, and education are not in themselves inputs." 19 Income, urbaniza-
tion, and education might be viewed more accurately as environmental 
factors which may serve to stimulate or depress the communication of 
certain demands and supports to public officials. Inputs, in the more 
commonly accepted usage of the term, refer not to forces or conditions 
such as education, urbanization, and income but to verbalizations or be-
havioral manifestations of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status 
quo.20 While the relationship between inputs and environment may be 
quite high, the relationship is by no means perfect nor constant. 
18 Sharkansky, The Politics of Taxing and Spending. 
19 Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An As-
sessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics" Journal of Politics, 
30 ( 1968 ), 510-538. ' 
20 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1965), 38ff. 
116 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The second major difficulty encountered in Dye's analysis lies in his 
inadequate operationalization of the political system. While electoral 
participation, party competition, legislative malapportionment, and party 
control may be important political valiables, they cannot adequately rep. 
resent the whole of the political system nor perhaps even its more im-
portant elements. Dye ignores, for example , the power of the governor, 
the degree of "professionalism" evident in state government and other 
possibility crucial characteristics of the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial branches of state governments. In other words, the formal govern-
mental system of a state is neglected in Dye's analysis. 
Building on the prior work of Dye and benefiting from the critiques 
of that work, a re-examination of the relationship between selected socio-
economic and political variables and tax policies in the American states 
will be attempted. The major differences between this study and the 
earlier study of Dye will be that ( 1) a different analytic model will be 
employed; ( 2) additional independent variables will be incorporate d in 
the analysis ( in particular, those variables which Dye labels "politi cal 
system variables" will be expanded in coverage); and ( 3) a new measure 
designed to more accurately represent intrestate differences in the dis-
tribution of tax costs among income groups will be utilized. 
Research Design 
The design of this study is based on the assumption that there are 
three classes of variables which constitute the major influences shap ing 
th e distribution of tax costs in a state . The model posits that the socio• 
economic environment of a society, the level and types of demands 
placed upon governmental institutions, and the characteristics of th ese 
governmental institutions are the major forces which shape the distribu-
tion of tax costs among income groups within a state . 
Dependent Variable 
The first major obstacle to be encountered is the task of devising a 
satisfactory measure of interstate variations in the distribution of tax 
costs among income groups in the states . Any attempt to determine the 
actual distribution of tax costs among income groups faces rather formi-
dable problems. In addition to complex economic questions of tax shift-
ing, individual income and expenditure patterns constantly chang e, 
making the most sophisticated computation of tax incidence only a well-
educated estimated. Despite these difficulties, some economists have at-
tempted to make these estimates . Studies of tax policies in the American 
states are handicapped, however, by the lack of tax inciden ce data com-
piled on a state-by-state basis. The absence of this information, pre vents 
any direct comparative analysis of interstate variation in tax incidence. 
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Fortunately the construction of an indirect measure of interstate varia-
tions in the distribution of tax burdens among income groups does not 
ose insurmountable difficulties. Of the more commonly used state taxes, 
~e individual income, the corporate income, and estate and gift taxes 
are considered to be the more progressive tax sources . Sales and prop-
erty taxes are considered to be quite regressive revenue sources.21 In 
order to obtain a measure of the degree to which a state has chosen pro-
gressive tax sources over regressive tax sources as a means of raising 
revenues, this study will utilize the ratio of the percentage of state tax 
revenue raised through progressive taxes ( individual income plus cor-
porate plus estate and gift taxes) to the percentage of state tax revenue 
raised through regressive taxes ( sales plus property taxes). A ratio ex-
ceeding unity would indicate reliance upon progressive tax sources; con-
versely, a ratio of less than unity would indicate reliance upon regressive 
tax sources. Table 1 presents the ratio of progressive tax reliance to re-
gressive tax reliance for the 48 states based on data from 1971.22 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in this analysis are divided into three 
classes: socioeconomic environment variables, demand structure varia-
bles, and governmental system variables. Measures of the socioeconomic 
environment utilized in this study include median family income, in-
dustrialization ( percentage of labor force engaged in manufacturing), 
urbanization ( percentage of population living in towns over 100,000), 
education ( median school years completed by persons over 25), per-
centage of families with less than $3,000 annual income,23 and the Cini 
index of income inequality. 24 
The first four variables ( income, industrialization, urbanization, and 
education) were selected on the basis of their prior usage by Dye and 
the high explanatory power they have exhibited in previous studies as 
correlates of levels of revenues and expenditures. Assuming that as a 
state develops economically a larger portion of its resources becomes 
available for redistributive policies such as progressive taxation, the 
measures of income, industrialization, urbanization, and education should 
be positively related to progressive taxation in the states. This hypothesis 
21 See George A. Bishop, "Tax Burden by Income Class," National Tax Journal, 
14 (1961), 54. 
22 Based on data obtained from Book of the States, 1970-71 ( Chicago: Council 
of State Governments, 1970). 
23 Measures for these first five variables were obtained from U. S. Department of 
Co=erce, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, General Social and 
Economic Characteristics. 
24 Thomas R. Dye, "Income Inequality and American State Politics," American 
Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 157-162. 
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assumes the existence of a "resource linkage" between the socioeconomic 
environment and public policy outputs. 25 
The percentage of families with less than $3,000 annual income and 
the Cini index of income inequality were included on the assumption of 
a "need linkage" between these variables and progressive taxation in 
the states. 26 If the assumption of a need linkage between environme nt 
and policy outputs is correct, progressive taxation should vary directly 
with the Cini index of income inequality and the percentage of families 
with incomes under $3,000. 
The first political variable used in this analysis is a measure designed 
to tap variations in the cultural milieu of state political systems. The 
Sharkansky-Elazar political culture scale assigns each state a political 
culture score ranging from one to nine along a continuum from "moral-
ist" to "individualist" to "traditionalist" culture. 27 Sharkansky notes that 
one of the most important factors which differentiate the three cultur es 
is their views toward governmental intervention in the community. The 
moralist culture welcomes intervention for the good of the community; 
the individualist would minimize intervention to permit a balance be-
tween activities in the private and public sectors; and the tradition alist 
would oppose all government interventions except those designe d to 
maintain the status quo. On this basis, progressive taxation is expected 
to vary inversely with scores on the Sharkansky-Elazar political culture 
scale ( high scores denote more traditionalistic cultures.) 
Levels of electoral participation, 28 legislative inducements to partici-
pation, 29 Democratic partisanship, 80 the degree of interparty competi-
tion, 81 and interest group strength 82 are used as further indicato rs of 
demand structure in the states. The initial hypothesis is that higher levels 
25 See Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Theories of Public Policy: Resource-Policy and 
Need-Policy Linkages Between Income and Welfare Benefits," Midwest Journal of 
Political Science, 15 ( 1971), 722-7 40. 
2a Ibid. 
27 See Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research 
Note," Polity, 2 ( 1969 ), 66-83. 
28 The participation index is taken from Lester W. Milbraith, "Individuals and 
Government," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), Politics in the American 
States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 36. 
29 This index is a summed measure noting the extent to which each state has legal 
measures facilitating participation, e.g. absence of literacy tests and residency re-
quirements, permanent registration, etc. See Milbraith, ibid., 46-47. 
80 This measure was obtained from Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in 
Jacob and Vines, ibid., 87. 
81 This measure was derived from Ranney's composite index, see ibid. The index 
is adjusted for this study to eliminate information about the partisan direction of 
one-party dominance. The adjusted formula is: Adjusted Ranney Index = 1.00 -
( .5000-- x), where x is the value of each state score on Ranney's index. Scores on 
the adjusted range from a minimum of .5000 to a maximum of 1.000. 
82 The measure of interest group strength is taken from Belle Zeller, American 
State Legislatures (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1954), 190-192. 
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f political participation will be associated with more progressive dis-
~butions of tax costs in the states. The measures of electoral participa-
tion and legislative inducements to participation are related to this hypo-
thesis. Accepting the proposition that lower income groups are less likely 
to be politically active, the assumption is that the higher the level of 
electoral participation, the more likely it is that voters in the lower in-
come groups have participated. Increased electoral participation among 
lower income groups is presumed to increase pressure for tax measures 
that are favorable to that group, i.e., progressive taxes.33 The use of Mil-
braith's index of legislative inducements to participation is based on a 
similar rationale. Assuming that legal barriers to participation are likely 
to have a greater impact on lower income groups, it is hypothesized that 
the removal or absence of such barriers will have a greater impact on 
participation among lower income groups. 
The partisan direction of electoral behavior is another component of 
demand structure. The extent of interparty competition and the degree 
of Democratic partisanship are used to measure this dimension of de-
mand structure. Following V. 0. Key's hypothesis that interparty com-
petition promotes the distribution of benefits to lower income groups, 34 
progressive taxation is expected to vary directly with interparty compe-
tition. The degree of Democratic partisanship evident in a state is in-
cluded on the assumption that the Democratic party is more favorable 
to programs benefiting lower income groups than is the Republican 
party. Progressive taxation, then, is expected to vary directly with the 
degree of Democratic partisanship. 
The final measure of demand structure is interest group strength. In-
terest group strength is expected to be negatively related to the adoption 
of progressive taxation. This hypothesis is based on Schattschneider's 
contention that interest group politics incorporates a bias against lower 
income groups which typically are not represented or are under-repre-
sented in the interest group system. 35 
Eight variables have been selected to represent important character-
istics of state governmental institutions. Three of the variables are re-
lated to the legislative branch of state government: legislative account-
ability/ representativeness, 36 legislative professionalism, 37 and legislative 
33 For evidence that lower income groups do indeed prefer progressive tax mea-
sures, see Elizabeth L. David, "A Comparative Study of Tax Preferences," National 
Tax Journal, 21 (1968), 98-102. 
34 V. 0. Key, Southern Politics ( New York: Random House, 1949 ), 298-311. 
85 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1960), 30-33. 
86 This measures combines state scores on two components of the Citizens Con-
ference on State Legislatures' FAIR scale. See Citizens Conference on State Legis-
latures, State Legislatures: An Evaluation of their Effectiveness ( New York: Praeger, 
1971). The accountability score is based on fourteen items related to comprehensi-
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party cohesion. 38 Legislative accountability/ representativeness is ex-
pected to be associated with more progressive distributions of tax bur-
dens. This expectation is based on the assumption that accountable and 
representative legislatures will be more easily subjected to constituenc y 
demands and, thus, less likely to take policy cues from internal elites or 
interest groups. Progressive taxation is also expected to vary directly with 
legislative professionalism and legislative party cohesion. The rationa le 
for the expected relationship between progressive taxation and legisla-
tive professionalism is based on the contention of U slaner and Weber 
that legislative professionalism is a reflection of legislative liberalis m. 
Uslaner and Weber argue: 
... the later concept [legislative professionalism] implies that a state 
has a well-paid legislature which processes a large number of bills 
dming any legislative session. Conservatives have often opposed the 
idea of a professional legislature on the basic ideological grounds 
that the best government is the one which does the least. Liber als, 
on the other hand, prefer a more activist government and would be 
more likely to support increased facilities and salary scale for state 
legislators. 39 
The hypothesis concerning the relationship between legislative party co-
hesion and progressive taxation is based on the assumption that the ac-
commodation of the diverse interests required to produce party cohesion 
will lead to the enactment of more progressive tax measures. 
Gubernatorial power 40 and tenure potential 41 are included in this 
analysis on the basis of two assumptions . First, it is assumed that gov-
ernors must respond to the interests of a diverse and broad-based con-
stituency and, as a result, are more likely to support progressive tax 
measures. Second, it is assumed that greater re-election possibilities and 
bility, public access to and adequacy of information, and internal accountability. The 
representativeness score is based on ten items related to identification of members 
and constituents, diversity, and member effectiveness. 
37 For the legislative professionalism index see Tohn G. Grwnm, "Effects of Leg-
islative Structure on Legislative Performance," in Richard I. Hofferbert and Ira 
Sharkansky (eds.), State and Urban Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 298-322. 
38 The legislative party cohesion score is taken from Duane Lockard, "State Party 
Systems and Policy Outputs," in Oliver Garceau, ed., Political Research and Political 
Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). Index scores have been re-
versed so that high scores are reflective of high levels of party cohesion. 
39 Eric M. Uslaner and Ronald E. Weber, "The 'Politics' of Redistribution : 
Towards a Model of the Policy-Making Process in the American States," ( unpu b-
lished mimeo), 15. 
40 For this measure see Joseph L. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," 
in Jacob and Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States, 232. 
41 Ibid. 
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extensive fonnal authority will provide governors with the necessary 
roeans to accomplish their policy objectives. 
Only one measure of the judicial branch of state government is used 
in this exploratory study. In a number of states, supreme court interpre-
tations of constitutional limitations on state taxing power have proved 
formidable barriers to progressive taxation . The hypothesis is that the 
percentage of Democrats on the state supreme comt will be positively 
related to progressive taxation. 42 This hypothesis is based on two assump-
tions: that the Democratic party is more favorable to programs benefiting 
lower income groups than is the Republican party and that party identi-
fication influences judicial behavior. 43 
Finally , two measures of general characteristics of state governmental 
institutions are included: innovativeness 44 and percentage of state em-
ployees under civil service coverage. 45 These two variables are assumed 
to be measures of the "reformist" character of state political systems. 
Progressive distribution of tax costs is expected to vary directly with 
these measures of "reformism." 
The major hypothesis of this study is that political variables will have 
greater explanatory value in regard to the distribution of tax costs among 
income groups than will socioeconomic variables. Following Fry and 
Winters, it is argued here that when attention is focused on the explana-
tion of the distribution of benefits and/ or costs rather than the levels of 
expenditures or revenues political variables have higher explanatory 
value than do socioeconomic variables. 
The subsidiary hypotheses concerning the relationship between each 
independent variable and the dependent variable will also be tested. In 
order to test these hypotheses, separate multiple regression analyses will 
be undertaken for the 48 states 46 and for the non-Southern states. Over-
all coefficients of multiple co1Telation and determination will be utilized 
as indicators of the explanatory power of the model. Simple and partial 
coefficients of correlation will be used to test the relationship between 
each independent variable and progressive taxation . Multiple-partial 
42 For data on party affiliation of state supreme court justices, see Stuart S. Nagel, 
The Legal Process from a Behavioral Perspective ( Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey 
Press, 1969). 
43 For evidence that party identification affects judicial behavior, see Stuart S. 
agel, "Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions," American Political Science 
Review, 55 ( 1961 ), 843-850; and Sidney Ulmer, "The Political Party Valiable on 
the Michigan Supreme Court," Journal of Public Law, 11 ( 1962), 352-362. 
44 For the innovation index see Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations 
among the American States," American Political Science Review, 63 ( 1969 ), 880-899. 
45 Council of State Governments, Book of the States, 1972-1973 (Lexington Ky: 
Council of State Governments, 1972). 
46 Alaska and Hawaii have been excluded because data for some of the inde-
pendent variables were not available. 
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coefficients of determination will be employed to assess the rela tive 
importance of political and socioeconomic variables in explaining inter-
state variations in the distribution of tax burdens among income groups. 
As Table 2 indicates, this effort to develop an explanatory model of 
interstate differences in the distribution of tax costs among income 
groups has been moderately successful. The multiple coefficient of de-
termination (R 2 ) is .41 for all 48 states, indicating that the mode l "ex-
plains" 41 % of the variance in interstate distributions of tax costs. More 
important, Table 2 demonstrates that when separate regression analyses 
aJ:e run for the socioeconomic and political variables used in this analy-
sis, the political variables account for 31 % of the variance while socio-
economics variables account for only 10% of the variance. 
The model meets with more success when the regional distinction of 
South and non-South is introduced . The multiple coefficient of determi-
nation for the 37 non-Southern states increases to .52. Once again, poli-
tical variables ( R2=.33) are found to have greater e>..'Planatory value than 
socioeconomic variables ( R2=.07). 
Table 2 also presents simple and partial coefficients of correlati on for 
each independent variable and progressive taxation for both the 48 states 
and the non-Southern states. In general, the selected independent varia-
bles bear the hypothesized relationships to progressive taxation in both 
the 48 states and the non-Southern states. 
An examination of the simple correlation coefficients for all 48 states 
reveals that five variables fail to achieve the hypothesized relati onship 
with progressive taxation in the states . These variables include : the Cini 
Index of Income Inequality, percentage under $3,000 annual income, 
Democratic party strength, legislative accountability/ represen tativeness, 
and percentage of Democrats on the Supreme Court. Three of these 
negative findings ( Democratic party strength, percentage of Dem ocrats 
on the Supreme Court, and legislative accountability/ representative ness) 
are reversed when the Southern states are excluded from the analysis. 
Turning to the partial correlation coefficients for all states, relation-
ships contrary to those originally hypothesized are found for: urb aniza-
tion, percentage under $3,000 annual income, the Sharkansky-Elaz ar po-
litical culture scale, legislative professionalism, and gubernatorial power 
as measured by Schlesinger's composite index. For the non-Southern 
states, industrialization and income are added to the list of contrary 
findings. 
Seven variables ( education, participation , interparty competition, leg-
islative inducements to participation, gubernatorial tenure, innovative-
ness, and extent of civil service coverage) are related to progressive taxa-
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tion in a manner consistent with the original hypotheses for both simple 
d partial correlation coefficients and regardless of regional breakdown. 
;e evidence is convincing that progressive taxation in the American 
states is positively related to each of these variables as originally hypo-
thesized. 
On the other hand, two variables ( interest group strength and per-
centage under $3,000 annual income) are related to progressive taxation 
in a manner inconsistent with the original hypotheses for both simple 
and partial correlation coefficients and regardless of regional breakdown. 
I-Jere the evidence appears convincing that neither of these variables is 
related to progressive taxation in the manner originally postulated. 
Confining attention to the nine variables mentioned above, for which 
the findings are rather conclusive, a number of observations appear in 
order. Five of the variables found to be positively correlated with pro-
gressive taxation ( education, participation, interparty competition, and 
interest group strength) are related in one way or another to the quan-
tity of inputs processed by a state political system.47 The general propo-
sition supported by these findings is that political systems faced with 
relatively high input loads are more likely to pursue progressive tax 
policies than political systems receiving relatively low input levels. 
The clearly positive relationship discovered between gubernatorial 
tenure potential and progressive taxation seems particularly puzzling 
when contrasted to the mixed results obtained in the case of Schlesinger's 
composite index of gubernatorial power. The apparent contradiction im· 
plied in these findings can be resolved to some degree in the light of 
work done by Sarah McCally. 48 In her attempt to test the influence of 
governors over their legislative parties, McCally found that the factor 
which best explained the success of governors was the level of electoral 
support received by the governors in subsequent primary elections. 
Schlesinger interprets the findings of McCally in the following manner: 
... the interpretation that fits well with our underlying thesis is that 
politicians are most responsive to their expectations, and a governor 
who has a good chance of returning gains a great deal of influence. 
This interpretation suggests also that of the elements in our power 
index, tenure potential is perhaps the most important. 49 
The findings concerning the positive relationships which obtain be-
tween innovativeness, extent of civil service coverage, and progressive 
47 Both interparty competition and education are correlated positively with elec-
toral turnout. 
48 Sarah P. McCally, "The Governor and His Legislative Party," Amesican Poli-
tcial Science Review, 60 ( 1966), 923-942. 
49 Schlesinger, "Politics of the Executive," 235. 
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taxation should be interpreted with some caution. Some compara tive 
state policy analysts have argued that these two measures and legisla-
tive professionalism may be taken as indicators of "reformism" in state 
government and are reflective of the success of the Progressive tradi tion 
in American politics.50 This argument, in effect, holds that while the vari. 
ables directly measure certain characteristics of governmental institu. 
tions, they are actually surrogate indicators of state political culture s. 
Accepting this contention for the moment, the relationships found in 
this analysis between innovativeness, civil service coverage, and progr es. 
sive taxation would be interpreted as indicating that state politica l sys-
tems respond to "progressive" characteristics of their political cultures 
in adopting progressive tax measures. 
A number of problems, however, are encountered in accepting the 
argument that innovativeness and extent of civil service coverage repre-
sent elements of state political cultures to which state political systems 
respond in making tax policy. First, Walker's Innovation Index is based 
on a large number of state policy innovations which involve the expendi-
ture of state funds. Of course, one major limitation on policy innovati on is 
the lack of "slack" funds. Progressive tax measures such as the personal 
income tax exhibit significantly more elasticity than do regressive tax 
measures. 51 In other words, income tax collections tend to increase more 
rapidly as personal income increases than do, for example, sales tax col-
lections. This means that states relying upon progressive tax sources usu-
ally find the problem of increasing state tax revenues to be somewhat 
less severe during periods of rising personal income. 52 As a result of these 
considerations, an alternative explanation of the findings would be that 
reliance upon progressive taxation is conducive to policy innovative ness. 
This analysis does not provide any evidence which can successfully re-
solve the question of which interpretation is most correct. The question, 
however, does appear to point to an area in which potentially fruitful 
research could be conducted. 
Other difficulties are encountered in accepting the "political culture" 
explanation of the relationship discovered between extent of civil service 
coverage and progressive taxation. An alternative explanation of this find-
ing is that administrative professionalism as reflected in the extent of 
civil service coverage is itself a contributing factor to progressive tax 
policy decisions. Fenton has argued that as civil service coverage ex· 
pands, "job oriented" employees are replaced by "issue-oriented" employ-
ees who perceive rewards more in terms of program developmen t and 
50 See Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewoods Cliff, ew Jer-
sey: Prentice-Hall , 1975), 296-297. 
51 Penniman, "The Politics of Taxation," 546-548. 
52 Jbid. 
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owth than in terms of employment security. 63 In addition, Wright has r und that state administratore are disposed to favor enlarging their own 
:ograros and those of state government generally. 64 If state administra-f ors are favorably inclined toward an expanded role for state govern-
ment generally and their own programs in particular, and if civil service 
employees are even more inclined toward this position, one might well 
expect to find that state administrators whose job security is not depen-
dent upon either the governor or the legislature are a formidable stimu-
lus for increased state spending. Effective bureaucratic demands for in-
creased state expenditures, in turn, might well stimulate a search for a 
wide variety of methods of revenue collection, including progressive tax 
measures such as the personal income tax. Again, the data presented here 
cannot indicate which of these two explanations of the link between civil 
service coverage and progressive taxation is most correct. The data does 
however rather clearly indicate that such a link does in fact exist. 
The unexpected finding that interest group strength is positively cor-
related with progressive taxation deserves attention . Two caveats con-
cerning this finding should be entered at this point. First, the measure 
of interest group strength used in this analysis is derived from data which 
antedates the dependent variable by almost twenty years, and, perhaps 
more important, the measure reflects assessment of the strength of in-
terest groups in general, rather than the strength of particular types of 
interest groups, e.g., merchants, unionized workers, manufacturers, and 
teachers. Second, the original hypotheses assumed that business groups 
and middle and upper income groups would be hostile to progressive 
tax measures. Business interests, however, might well prefer personal 
income taxes to high property taxes truly reflective of the value of in-
dustrial and commercial property or to sales taxes which add to the 
effective price consumers must pay for goods and services. The interpre-
tation of this finding which is most consistent with the previous discus-
sion is that whether participation is measured by voting turnout, by 
factors which stimulate turnout, or by interest group strength, high input 
levels are associated with increased reliance on progressive taxes. 
The negative relationship discovered between the percentage of fami-
lies with incomes under $3,000 annual income and progressive taxation 
should be evaluated in light of the positive relationships between pro-
gressive taxation and legislative inducements to participation and the 
53 John Fenton, People and Parties in Politics ( Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 
1966), 46-49, 50-78. 
54 Deil S. Wright, "Executive Leadership in State Administration," Midwest Jour-
nal af Political Science, 11 ( 1967), 1-26. 
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overall rate of electoral participation. As Fry and Winters noted in ex-
plaining similar results in their analysis of the politics of redistribution : 
If we are correct in assuming that the latter two measures [legisla. 
tive inducements and electoral participation] indicate the extent of 
electoral participation by lower income groups, we can tentatively 
conclude that, as might be expected, redistribution to the lowest 
income classes is more a function of participation by these classes 
than of their size.55 
The major :finding of this study concerns the relative importance of 
political and socioeconomic variables in explaining interstate variation s 
in the distribution of tax costs. As noted earlier, most studies of state 
policy outputs have found that socioeconomic variables have greate r 
impact on interstate variations in policy than do political variables. This 
analysis, however, :finds that political variables have substantial inde-
pendent impact on state tax policies and that they have considerab ly 
more impact than socioeconomic variables. The relative explanatory 
power of the political and socioeconomic variables used in this analysis 
is indicated by the multiple-partial coefficients of determination displayed 
in Table 2. For the 48 states the multiple-partial for political variable s 
controlled for socioeconomic variables is .34, while the multiple-partia l 
for the socioeconomic variables controlled for the political variables is .14. 
For the non-Southern states, the multiple-partial for the political variables 
controlled for socioeconomic variables is .48 while the multiple-parti al 
for the socioeconomic variables controlled for political variables is .28. 
For both the 48 states and the non-Southern states, the political variab les 
included in this analysis are considerably more powerful than the socio-
economic variables in explaining variance in state tax policies. 
An objection which could be raised against this interpretation of the 
multiple-partial coefficients is that the :finding may be an artifact of the 
sheer number of political variables used in this analysis relative to the 
number of socioeconomic variables. One method of confronting this 
objection bas been employed in this study. Taking only the :five most 
powerful political variables versus the :five most powerful socioeconomic 
variables, the multiple-partial for the political variables controlled for 
the socioeconomic variables is .36, while the multiple-partial for the 
socioeconomic variables controlled for the political variables is .17 for 
the 48 states. When the same comparison is made for the non-Southe rn 
states, the multiple-partial for political variables controlled for socio-
economic variables is .41, while the multiple-partial for socioeconomic 
variables controlled for political variables is .17. 
55 Fry and Winters, op. cit., 521. 
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concluswn 
This study has presented an explanatory analysis of the correlates of 
rogressive taxation in the American states. The analysis indicated that 
~e educational level of the citizenry, electoral turnout, party competi-
tion, legislative inducements to participation, interest group strength, 
gubernatorial tenure potential, extent of civil service coverage, and policy 
innovativeness were positively related to reliance upon progressive taxa-
tion. The percentage of families under $3,000 annual income was found 
to be negatively associated with progressive taxation. 
More broadly, the study addressed the question of whether political 
characteristics of the states have any significant relationship with the 
distribution of tax costs among income groups. The results demonstrate, 
at least tentatively, that political variables have a greater impact on state 
tax decisions than the previous literature would have led one to believe 
and that political variables have greater explanatory value in this policy 
area than do socioeconomic variables. By turning attention from the 
explanation of revenue and expenditure levels to the explanation of policy 
costs and benefits, political scientists are more likely to encounter a 
dimension of public policy that is influenced significantly by political 
phenomena. 
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TABLE 1. Progressive to Regressive Tax Ratios for the 48 States, 1971 
1. Oregon .............. . . 2.563 25. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . .352 
2. Delaware .............. 2.133 26. Missouri ........ . ...... . 341 
3. Massachusetts .......... 1.437 27. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .338 
4. New York . .... ........ 1.328 28. Connecticut .. . ... . .... . 333 
5. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .949 29. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .333 
6. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . .918 30. New Hampshire . . . . . . . .315 
7. Wisconsin . ............ . 902 31. Arizona .. . ............ . 285 
8. Maryland ............... 858 32. North Dakota ...... . ... . 280 
9. Idaho .. .. ............. . 787 33. Arkansas .............. . 277 
10. Vermont ............ .... 708 34. Louisiana ........... . . . 271 
11. Virginia ............... . 704 35. New Mexico . . . . . . ..... . 257 
12. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .654 36. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247 
13. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . .600 37. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235 
14. North Carolina . .... . ... . 596 38. West Virginia . . ... . ... . . 209 
15. Illinois .. .. ............ . 534 39. New Jersey ............ . 186 
16. Utah .................. .453 40. Tennessee ............ . . 176 
17. Michigan .. .... . ....... .438 41. Mississippi ........ .... . 172 
18. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . .436 42. South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . .039 
19. Iowa .............. . ... .416 43. Washington .......... . . 025 
20. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .403 44. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .023 
21. South Carolina ......... . 386 45. Florida . . .............. . 014 
22. Kansas ............. . .. . 385 46. Wyoming ..... . ....... . 014 
23. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . .356 47. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .012 
24. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .353 48. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .000 
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TABLE 2. Summary of Findings 
I. Variables 
Socioeconomic Variables 
Resources 
Urbanization ...... .. ..... . 
Indu strialization ..... . . . ... . . . 
Education ..... . ............ . 
Median Income ......... . .... . 
Needs 
Cini Index ...... ...... .. . ... . 
% under $3,000 ............. . . 
Demand Structure 
Political Culture . . . . .... . . . . .. . . 
Electoral Turnout .............. . 
Party Competition . . .. . .... . ... . 
Democratic Strength ........... . 
I.G. Strength ........ . ......... . 
Leg. Inducements ............. . 
Governmental Institutions 
Leg. Account / Rep ............ . 
Leg. Professionalism .. . . . .... .. . 
Leg. Party Cohesion ... . ....... . 
Governor Power . . ... . ......... . 
Governor Tenure .............. . 
%Democrats Supreme Court ..... . 
Innovation Index . . ....... .. . .. . 
Civ. Serv. Coverage .. . .... . 
ALL STATES 
Simple Partial 
.21 
.11 
.21 
. 29 
-.23 
-.29 
-.22 
.27 
-.29 
-.13 
.02 
.18 
-.05 
.25 
.34 
.23 
.27 
-.16 
.35 
.22 
-.13 
.10 
.16 
.01 
.36 
-.12 
.06 
.29 
.01 
.12 
.33 
.10 
.23 
-.07 
.13 
-.20 
.30 
.06 
.16 
.32 
II. Multiple Coefficients of Correlation and Determination 
R R2 
All Variables . ................. . . . .64 .48 
Socioeconomic Variables ...... .. .. . .31 .10 
Political Variables . . . .. .. ... . . . .56 .31 
III. Multiple-Partial Coefficients of Determination 
Political Variables Controlled 
for Socioeconomic Variables . . . . . . . . . . .34 
Socioeconomic Variables Controlled 
for Political Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 
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NON-SOUTHERN 
Simple Partial 
.19 
.13 
.12 
.21 
-.08 
-.22 
-.10 
.17 
-.20 
.08 
.16 
.12 
.01 
.28 
.27 
.14 
.22 
-.02 
.29 
.19 
R 
.72 
.26 
.57 
.48 
.28 
-.21 
-.07 
.12 
-.18 
.47 
-.33 
.32 
.38 
.07 
.13 
.48 
.24 
.04 
-.18 
.19 
-.26 
.22 
.17 
.34 
.46 
R2 
.52 
.07 
.33 
